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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COERCED CONFESSIONS-CIVIL
DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 1983
On June 19, 1963, at 5:30 a.m., Harvey Kerr, a 17 year-old black
youth, was taken into custody by Chicago police officers. Kerr alleged
that at the police station, "he was kicked and hit by an officer ... [and]
required to take a polygraph examination."' Kerr alleged that he was
then informed that he would be allowed to eat and use the washroom fa-
cilities only if he confessed. The next morning, approximately 27 hours
after he was apprehended, Kerr was brought before a magistrate, who in
turn bound him over to the Cook County Grand Jury. He was subse-
quently indicted for murder and burglary. At the conclusion of his trial,
the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Nevertheless, Kerr was held until
December 2, 1964-some 18 months-at which time a nolle prosequi was
entered.
As a result of these actions, Kerr brought an action for damages against
the individual police officers and the city of Chicago for violation of his
civil rights. Kerr's complaint alleged ten different violations of his civil
rights, 2 the combination of which forced him to submit an involuntary
confession which, in turn, was used to illegally detain him for 18 months.
The coerced confession and illegal detention, asserted Kerr, constituted a
violation of his fourteenth amendment guarantee against deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. The complaint concluded: "as a direct
and proximate result of these acts of the defendants, the plaintiff suffered
pain and injury and mental anguish and seeks judgment therefore."'3
The District Court dismissed the complaint as against the city of Chicago,
and, on the merits, found for the defendant policemen. The Seventh
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals reversed as against the police
officers, but affirmed the dismissal of the City of Chicago as a party de-
fendant. Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970).
Kerr v. City of Chicago is the first case allowing a plaintiff who has
been forced to submit an involuntary confession to recover damages from
1. Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1970).
2. Brief for Appellant at 4.
3. Supra note 1, at 1137.
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the extractor of that confession. The purpose of this paper is to analyze
this case in relation to the statute upon which the action is based,
42 U.S.C. §1983 (1964) (hereinafter referred to as section 1983). 4  The
purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the Kerr decision is a logical
result of the judicial history of that statute, and to preview the natural
and direct consequences of this decision in both criminal and constitu-
tional law.
Section 1983 was first enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 5
Its primary purpose was to allow Negroes who had been denied their civil
rights to seek restitution in a federal court." If a black man were de-
prived of his rights by a state official, he was to be afforded a positive
civil action in a federal court. From 1871 until 1939, the courts strictly
interpreted the "under color of law" clause of section 1983. The courts
granted relief only when the deprivation was a result of oflicial action
taken pursuant to an unconstitutional statute which discriminated against
blacks.7
In Myers v. Anderson,8 several black plaintiffs brought suit to recover
damages against Maryland voter registration officials who had refused to
register them. Plaintiffs claimed that such refusal effectively deprived
them of their right to vote, which was guaranteed by the fifteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
Defendants had been acting pursuant to a Maryland suffrage statute
when the alleged deprivations occurred. This statute had a "grandfather
clause" which discriminated against blacks.9 Defendants argued that the
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) reads as follows: "Every person who under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Terri-
tory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
5. Originally enacted as section 1 of the Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1,
17 Stat. 13, entitled An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and for other Purposes.
6. See, e.g., CoNo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1871) (remarks of Con-
gressman Lane); Id. at 459 (remarks of Congressman Coburn), and 514 (remarks
of Congressman Poland). See also STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-
1877 (1965).
7. E.g., Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
8. 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
9. Id. at 377. Under the statute, only the following could register to vote:
"1. All taxpayers of the City of Annapolis assessed on the city books for at least
five hundred dollars. 2. And duly naturalized citizens. 2 . And male children
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clause in controversy was not violative of the fifteenth amendment be-
cause, "[e]ven if this clause excluded all negroes, it would not necessarily
follow that they were excluded on account of their race." 10  The defend-
ants did not, however, rest on the constitutional question alone. They
next asserted a defense which faintly smelled like the immunity doctrine
which later developed. If the statute were unconstitutional and void, de-
fendants contended, then they had no power or authority to register the
plaintiffs, since their authority was based entirely on the suffrage act.
Therefore, if defendants had no authority to register the plaintiffs, they
could hardly be liable for failure to do so."
The Supreme Court rejected both defenses and granted relief to the
plaintiffs. Emphasizing throughout the opinion that the statute's uncon-
stitutionality was a prerequisite to recovery, the court found the suffrage
act, particularly the "grandfather clause," to be violative of the fifteenth
amendment. "The result then is this, that the third standard is void be-
cause it amounts to a mere denial of the operative effect of the Fifteenth
Amendment.' 1 2  Apparently, the Court felt that proving the unconstitu-
tionality of the statute under which the officials acted was necessary in
order to raise a section 1983 question.
Concerning the second defense, the Court held that the statute's uncon-
stitutionality did not shield the defendants from liability, as defendants
had the responsibility to register all qualified voters long before the statute
was passed. "The mere change in some respects of the administrative
machinery by the new statute did not relieve the new officers of their duty
nor did it interpose a shield to prevent the operation upon them of the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States. . ... ,13 In addition,
allowing the unconstitutionality of the act to shield the defendants would
of naturalized citizens who have reached the age of twenty-one years. 3. All
citizens who, prior to January 1, 1868, were entitled to vote in the State of Maryland
or any other State of the United States at a state election, and the lawful male
descendants of any person who prior to January 1, 1868, was entitled to vote in this
State or in any other State of the United States at a state election, and no person not
coming within one of the three enumerated classes shall be registered as a legal
voter of the City of Annapolis or qualified to vote at the municipal elections held
therein, and any person so duly registered shall, while so registered, be qualified to
vote at any municipal election held in said city; said registration shall in all other
respects conform to the laws of the State of Maryland relating to and providing for
registration in the State of Maryland."
10. Supra note 8, at 371.
11. Supra note 8, at 370.
12. Supra note 8, at 380.
13. Supra note 8, at 382.
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completely emasculate section 1983, since proving that same unconstitu-
tionality was an indispensable part of plaintiff's case.
In Nixon v. Herndon,4 plaintiff, a black man, sued several Texas
Judges of Elections for $5,000. The defendants, acting pursuant to a state
statute which held, "in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate
in a Democratic party primary election held 'in the State of Texas,''15
had refused to allow plaintiff to vote in a primary election.
The defendants asserted the defense that a political party was a "volun-
tary" organization whose regulation was a "political" rather than a "legal"
matter. As a political organization, defendants continued, the political
party is free to hold its elections without regard to the voting provisions of
the United States Constitution. Specifically, defendants concluded, the
right of a citizen to vote in a primary is not within the purview of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.'8
Correspondingly, a law which restricts voting in such a primary is not un-
constitutional.
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Holmes quickly refuted the above
defense and held for plaintiff. Dismissing the political-legal distinction
as a mere "play upon words," and skipping over the question of whether
the Texas law violated the fifteenth amendment, Holmes found the law to
be a ". . . direct and obvious . . infringement of the Fourteenth [Amend-
ment]."'1 7 Holmes pointed out that the Texas law blatantly denied equal
protection of the law to the black. For this deprivation, plaintiff was
entitled to $5000.
The Lane casel8 shifted the focus back to the fifteenth amendment.
In that case, the Oklahoma legislature had passed a statute which de-
manded that those qualified voters who had not voted in the 1914 election
apply for voter registration between April 30, 1916 and May 11, 1916. If
a person did not register during that period, he would permanently lose
the right to register and, hence, the right to vote. In addition, in order to
be eligible to vote in the election of 1914, a constituent had to pass a
"literacy test from which white voters were in effect relieved through the
operation of a 'grandfather clause.' "19 A black man who failed to reg-
ister during the allotted time, and, consequently, lost his voting privilege,
brought suit for $5,000, basing his claim on section 1983.20
14. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
15. Id. at 540.
16. Supra note 14, at 538-39.
17. Supra note 14, at 540-41.
18. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
19. Id. at 269.
20. At that time codified as 8 U.S.C. 43.
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In deciding for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
statute violated the fifteenth amendment, and that it was this unconstitu-
tionality which gave the right of action to the plaintiff: "[T]he narrow
basis of the supplemental registration . . . leave[s] no escape from the
conclusion that the means chosen as substitutes for the invalidated 'grand-
father clause' were themselves invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment." 2 1
The above cases demonstrate typical section 1983 actions prior to 1939.
By holding that the "under color of law" clause encompassed only official
action taken pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the courts severely
limited the application of the section. As a result of this strict interpreta-
tion, only a sparsity of cases based on section 1983 met with success. In
1939, a seer would not likely forecast that this same section would pro-
vide the base for a myriad of cases by 1970.
From 1939-1961, the United States Supreme Court handed down four
decisions, the combination of which greatly enlarged the scope of section
1983. The case of Hague v. C.I.O.22 was the first decision which granted
relief based on section 1983 to a claimant who was not the victim of racial
discrimination. Plaintiff, C.I.O., was an unincorporated labor organiza-
tion which sought an injunction against Mayor Hague of Jersey City,
New Jersey. The mayor and his subordinates had been enforcing an or-
dinance which forbade any person to distribute any newspaper, periodi-
cal, paper, pamphlet, etc., and, consequently, had refused to allow the
C.I.O. to distribute literature which discussed various provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act.2 3
While granting the injunction, the Court implied that an action would
lie only if the official action was taken pursuant to an unconstitutional
statute. "As the ordinance is void, the respondents are entitled to a de-
cree so declaring and an injunction against its enforcement by the petition-
ers."'24 Thus, the Court was not yet ready to liberalize the construction
of the "under color of law" clause.
Since the defendants in the Hague case argued that the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction over the causes of action, it may be appropriate to
briefly interrupt the tracing of the judicial history of section 1983 to discuss
jurisdictional issues which confront the plaintiff who bases his action on
this section.
The plaintiffs in Hague asserted federal jurisdiction upon two subsec-
21. Supra note 18, at 277.
22. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
23. Id. at 501.
24. Supra note 22, at 518.
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tions of the Judicial Code of 1911. The first subsection cited by plain-
tiffs was today's 28 U.S.C. §1331 (3) (1964),25 which grants the Dis-
trict Courts general "federal question" jurisdiction. Under the provisions
of this section (1911 version) the federal courts had jurisdiction over cases
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, when the
amount in controversy exceeded $3,000.26 The lead opinion in Hague
found that the individual plaintiffs had not shown the requisite damages
and that, " . . . the plaintiffs may not aggregate their interests in order
to attain the amount necessary to give jurisdiction. ' 27  Consequently,
the Supreme Court held that the federal courts did not have general
"federal question" jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's second assertion of a jurisdictional base met with more suc-
cess. Under section 24(14) of the 1911 Code-28 U.S.C. §1343(3)
(1964) 2 8-the federal courts have jurisdiction over cases instituted to re-
dress the deprivation under color of law, of any right, privilege, or im-
munity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States provid-
ing for equal rights. 29 The Court held that the right to discuss the provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act and to distribute written mate-
rial concerning that act was a privilege guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. Consequently, the federal District Court was a proper forum
for the case.30
The lead opinion in Hague, while admitting federal jurisdiction, nar-
rowly confined its decision to the facts of the case. The lead opinion held
only that the right to disseminate information concerning the National La-
bor Relations Act was a privilege guaranteed by the "privilege and im-
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964): "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
26. Supra note 22, at 507: "Subsection (1) gives jurisdiction of 'suits of a civil
nature, at law or in equity, . . . where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive
of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000 'and' arises under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States.'"
27. Supra note 22, at 508.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) reads as follows: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by
any person: (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States."
29. Supra note 22, at 508.
30. Supra note 22, at 512-13.
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munities" clause of the fourteenth amendment.31 By stressing the priv-
ilege and immunities clause and limiting its decision to, " . . . the right
to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and oppor-
tunities to accrue to citizens therefrom, ''" 2 the lead opinion implied that
28 U.S.C. §1343(3) would not grant the federal courts jurisdiction if
plaintiffs had based their claim on violations of the due process clause of
the same amendment. That is, according to the majority's implication,
if the plaintiffs had been disseminating information about religion, or the
latest train robbery, or the World Series, the federal courts would not
have had jurisdiction. Under §1343(3), the federal courts have jurisdic-
tion only over cases which allege deprivation of rights protected by the
privileges and immunities clause. Furthermore, this clause protects only
rights growing out of a citizen's relationship with the national government.
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Stone rejected this analaysis. Ac-
cording to Stone, section 1343(3) gives the District Courts jurisdiction
to hear cases alleging the deprivation of "personal liberties" guaranteed
by the Constitution. Stone implied a property right-personal right di-
chotomy, and asserted that section 1343(3) provided jurisdiction when
the gist of plaintiff's action is deprivation of a personal right. No juris-
dictional amount need be proved since the evaluation of money damages
for the deprivation of a personal right is difficult if not impossible. On
the other hand, if plaintiff's claim is based on the deprivation of a property
right, Stone indicated section 1331 was available, provided of course that
the damage alleged exceeded that section's minimal requirements.3 3  In
Stone's words:
No more grave and important issue can be brought to this Court than that of free-
dom of speech and assembly, which the due process clause guarantees to all persons
regardless of their citizenship, but which the privileges and immunities clause se-
cures only to citizens, and then only to the limited extent that their relationship to
the national government is affected. . . . I think respondents' right to maintain it
does not depend on their citizenship and cannot rightly be made to turn on the
existence or non-existence of a purpose to disseminate information about the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. It is enough that petitioners have prevented respondents
from holding meetings and disseminating information whether for the organization
of labor unions or for any other lawful purpose. 3 4
In Stone's view, personal rights must be protected by section 1983, and,
hence, section 1343(3) is the provision which grants federal jurisdiction
to actions based on deprivations of those personal rights. The section deal-
31. Supra note 22, at 512.
32. Supra note 22, at 513.
33. Supra note 22, at 518-32.
34. Supra note 22, at 524-25.
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ing with general "federal question" jurisdiction, section 1331, is available
to plaintiffs deprived of property rights.
The Hague case was the last Supreme Court decision which discussed
jurisdictional problems raised by section 1983. Several lower courts have,
however, subsequently approached the problem of finding a jurisdictional
base in different ways. These cases must be mentioned.
In Hornsby v. Allen,3 5 plaintiff claimed that she had been deprived of
her right to secure a liquor license. The court analyzed the jurisdictional
question under section 1343(3) exactly as it analyzed the problem of
whether plaintiff stated a valid claim under section 1983.36 Finding that
the plaintiff did state a valid claim, the court ruled that, "[i]t follows that
the trial court must entertain the suit and determine the truth of its alle-
gations. ' 'a7 According to this court, simply filing a valid complaint based
on section 1983 established federal jurisdiction based on section 1343(3).
Stone's personal right-property right dichotomy was apparently to be ig-
nored. This case represents the broadest construction yet given to section
1343(3).
In 1968, King v. Smith'as reached the Supreme Court. This case found
plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of an Alabama Department of
Pensions Security regulation. The Supreme Court neatly sidestepped the
potential section 1343(3) question by ruling, in a footnote to the text, that
since plaintiff prayed for an injunction, the District Court had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).3 9 This statute provides that the District
Court has jurisdiction over cases which demand the enjoining of a State
statute.
40
In 1969, a case arose in the Second Circuit in which plaintiff asserted
jurisdiction under section 1343(3).41 The court dogmatically announced
that Stone's opinion in Hague was the prevailing view of the scope of sec-
35. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
36. Supra note 35, at 610-12.
37. Supra note 35, at 612.
38. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
39. Id. at 312.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) reads as follows: "An interlocutory or permanent
injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute
by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execu-
tion of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission
acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the
application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges un-
der section 2284 of this title."
41. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969).
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tion 1343(3).42 Quoting what it claimed was the Stone rule, the court
stated that section 1343(3) applied, "whenever the right or immunity is
one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringe-
ment of property rights."'43  According to this court, the above formula-
tion, "generously construed," determines the scope of section 1343(3).
All suits alleging deprivation of "personal" constitutional rights-with the
word "personal" liberally interpreted-are within its scope. 44  Suits al-
leging other deprivations must fit under the umbrella of section 1331.
Capsulizing, today a plaintiff has many possible jurisdictional bases for
his section 1983 action. First, if the claim is over $10,000, and is based
on the deprivation of a property right, plaintiff can assert jurisdiction
under section 1331-general "federal question" jurisdiction. As prece-
dents, this plaintiff could cite Stone's opinion, as well as the lead opinion,
in Hague. Second, if plaintiff's theory is that he is a "citizen" who has
been deprived a "privilege or immunity," he can assert jurisdiction under
section 1343(3), and cite the lead Hague opinion as precedent. Of
course, no minimal amount need be claimed under this theory. Third,
when plaintiff claims that he has been deprived of a personal liberty, he
may assert jurisdiction under section 1343(3), citing Stone's Hague opin-
ion as well as the Eisen case as controlling. Again, the amount of dam-
ages claimed by this plaintiff is immaterial. Fourth, if plaintiff's claim
is for less than $10,000, but is not solely or primarily based on the depriva-
tion of a personal right, he may assert jurisdiction under section 1343(3).
This plaintiff would cite Hornsby as controlling, and might also argue that
the Eisen liberalization of the Stone rule is a precedent for his case.
Finally, a plaintiff who seeks only to enjoin a state statute should assert
jurisdiction under section 2281, and cite King v. Smith as precedent.
42. Supra note 41, at 566: "We therefore hold, although with a good deal less
than complete assurance, that Justice Stone's Hague formulation, generously con-
strued, should continue to be regarded as the law of this circuit."
43. Supra note 41, at 564.
44. A few of the more unusual applications of the Stone interpretation of sec-
tion 1343(3) are: McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (right
to attend an integrated school); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (first
amendment guarantee of freedom of speech); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (the rights to vote and have an
equal effect given to one's vote); and Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943) (right of members of Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute their literature).
Contra, Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967); Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d
172 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967); Abernathy v. Carpenter,
208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962), alternative ground aff'd., 373 U.S. 241 (1963);
Reiling v. Lacey, 93 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1950), appeal dismissed, 341 U.S. 901
(1951). All of these cases concern the constitutionality of state tax statutes. Ap-
parently, protection against discrimination by a state tax statute does not fall within
the classification of a "personal liberty."
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Returning to the history of section 1983, the Hague decision, it will be
remembered, allowed non-blacks to recover under section 1983. The
strict interpretation of the "under color of law" clause, however, remained
established. In order to be acting "under color of law," a person still had
to be acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.
The case of United States v. Classic,45 although not a section 1983
case, was the first decision which broadened the definition of "under color
of law" to include actions other than those taken pursuant to an unconsti-
tutional statute. In that case, the United States criminally prosecuted
Classic for altering, falsely counting, and certifying ballots.4 6 In ruling
that the indictment against Classic did state a cause of action, the Supreme
Court said, "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."
'47
In 1945, the Supreme Court decision of Screws v. United States45 fur-
ther expanded the definition of "under color of law." This was another
criminal case in which the United States charged a sheriff with violation
of section 20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 52.49  In delivering the
opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
It is clear that under 'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law .... Acts of
officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included whether they
hew to the line of their authority or overstep it. If, as suggested, the statute was
designed to embrace only action which the state in fact authorized, the words 'under
color of any law' were hardly apt words to express the idea.50
Thus, Douglas' definition of "under color of law" includes all action by
officials taken pursuant to their duties, regardless of whether such action
is authorized. This definition has prevailed.
To briefly summarize, the development of section 1983 had advanced
considerably with the Hague, Classic, and Screws decisions. As a result
45. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
46. Id. at 307. Classic was a commissioner of elections in Louisiana.
47. Supra note 45, at 326.
48. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
49. Id. at 93. This statute, now codified as 8 U.S.C. § 242, reads as follows:
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of
such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are pre-
scribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both;" [The phrase "and if death results
shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life"] was deleted in
the codification.
50. Supra note 48, at I11.
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of Hague, section 1983 protected white, as well as black, plaintiffs. As a
result of Classic and Screws, the construction of the words "under color
of law" (as they were found in other statutes) had been so liberalized as
to include all actions taken by public officials pursuant to their official du-
ties. However, the courts had still not specifically ruled that this interpre-
tation of "under color of law" extended to section 1983. This ruling was
soon to come.
In 1961, thirteen Chicago police officers broke into one Monroe's
home, ransacked it, and arrested Monroe. They detained him on an open
charge, and interrogated him concerning a murder. For ten hours, Mon-
roe was neither brought before a magistrate nor allowed to call an attorney
or his family. He brought suit against the police officers and the city of
Chicago, basing his action on R.S. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983. In upholding
his complaint, the Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape,51 held that the
expanded definition of "under color of law" iterated in the Classic and
Screws decision was proper, and that, "this phrase should be accorded the
same construction. . . in 1979 .... -52
While the Monroe Court upheld the complaint as to the police officers,
it dismissed the City of Chicago as a defendant. Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing the majority decision, pointed out that the Congressional Record
indicated that Congress rejected the notion of municipal liability.53 After
briefly tracing Congressional rejection of an amendment which would pro-
vide for such liability, 54 Douglas concluded that, "we cannot believe that
the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them (the
city). Accordingly, we hold that the motion to dismiss against the City of
Chicago was properly dismissed." 55  Thus, the doctrine of municipal
immunity was established. It remains firmly entrenched today, as evi-
denced by Kerr.56
There are, of course, defenses which should be mentioned as they are
frequently asserted in section 1983 actions. First, the qualified immuni-
ties of "good faith" and "probable cause" are available to police officers.
In Pierson v. Ray,57 a case based on section 1983, the Supreme Court
51. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
52. Id. at 185.
53. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 800-01, 804, 820-21 (1871).
54. Supra note 51, at 188-91.
55. Supra note 51, at 191-92.
56. Contra, McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), where
the court held that a municipality waived its immunity by carrying liability insurance.
The City was liable, however, only to the extent of the insurance coverage, not
in excess of the face value of the policy.
57. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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stated that, "[u]nder the prevailing view in this country a peace officer
who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest
simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved . . . the same
consideration would seem to require excusing him from liability for acting
under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later
held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied."58  The Court went on
to rule that the defenses of "good faith" and "probable cause" do apply to
cases based on section 1983.19 As long as the officer has acted with
"probable cause" or in "good faith," he is immune from a section 1983
action.
Other immunity defenses are: judicial immunity, 0 immunity for prose-
cutors when acting within their judicial capacity, 6' and immunity for
other public officials.6 2
The Monroe decision, which incorporated the Classic-Screws interpreta-
tion of "under color of law" to section 1983, immensely widened the scope
of section 1983. As a result, a tremendous volume of cases based on this
statute has been brought before the courts during the last nine years.
The total number of private civil actions brought under civil rights statutes
in federal courts in 1961, the year of Monroe v. Pape, was 270.63 In
contrast, the number of similar cases brought during the fiscal year of
1969 was 2,180.64
These actions have been based on many different types of civil right
58. Id. at 555.
59. Supra note 57, at 554-58. See also Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th
Cir. 1968); Dodd v. Spokane County, Washington, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968);
Daniels v. Van DeVenter, 382 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1967); Notaras v. Ramon,
383 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1967).
60. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601
(9th Cir. 1965); Harvey v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964); Agnew v. Moody,
330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1964); see also Comment, 18 ARK. L. REV. & BAR Ass'N
J. 81 (1964).
61. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965); Corsican Productions v.
Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1964); Kenny v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956); Yasselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.
1926), aff'd mem., 275 U.S. 503 (1927); see also Comment, 42 N.Y.U. INTRA L.
REv. 160 (1967).
62. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959); Francis v. Lyman, 216
F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954); Campbell v. Glenwood Hills Hospital, Inc., 224 F. Supp.
27 (D. Minn. 1963); Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1963); see
generally, Note, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1953). But see Jobson v. Henne, 355
F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966) where the court refused to grant immunity to prison offi-
cials who had caused slave-like conditions to prevail, under which inmates had to
labor.
63. [1961] DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. CouRTs ANN. REP., Table c-2.
64. [1969] Di. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS ANN. REP., Table c-2.
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violations. Most cases result from deprivations of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. These due process deprivations include
actions based on illegal arrest and detention, 5 police brutality, 6" illegal
search and seizure," 7 economic discrimination, 8 an official's refusal to
allow a person to consult his attorney, 9 and racial discrimination. 70
However, due process violations have not been the only grounds for a
section 1983 action. The infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, 71
which is prohibited by the eighth amendment, as well as violations of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment7 2 have likewise
65. See Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1969); Whirl v. Kern,
407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Joseph v. Rowlen,
402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964); Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1963);
Danner v. Moore, 306 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. Penn. 1969); Beauregard v. Wingard,
230 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Johnson v. Crumlish, 224 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.
Penn. 1963); Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (D. Idaho 1962); Yates v.
Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962); Peterson v.
Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
66. See Jenkins v. Avearett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340
F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965); Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963); Cohen
v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1961); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921
(1961); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel.
Smith v. Heil, 308 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D. Penn. 1970); United States ex rel. Washing-
ton v. Chester County Police Dep't, Chester Penn., 300 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Penn.
1969); Bargainer v. Michal, 233 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Jordan v. Kelly,
223 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Roberts v. Trapnell, 213 F. Supp. 49 (E.D.
Penn. 1962); Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
67. See Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1969); Johnson
v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1969); Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th
Cir. 1965); Sheridan v. Williams, 333 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964); Cohen v. Norris,
300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962); Danner v. Moore, 306 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. Penn. 1969);
Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426 (N.D. 11. 1969).
68. Elmwood Properties, Inc. v. Conzelman, 418 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969);
Corsican Productions v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1964); Hornsby v. Allen,
326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Lee v. Hodges, 321 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1963);
Service Employees Int'l. Union v. County of Butler, Pa., 306 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D.
Penn. 1969); Seiden v. Boone, 221 F. Supp. 845 (D. Del. 1963).
69. See Beyer v. Werner, 299 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. N.Y. 1969); Brzozowski v.
Randall, 281 F Supp. 306 (E.D. Penn. 1968).
70. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Williams v.
Howard Johnson's Inc. of Washington, 323 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1963); Black v.
Bonds, 308 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ala. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Author-
ity, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
71. See Hudson v. Hardy, 424 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hancock v. Avery,
301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 48 F.R.D. 102
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
72. See, e.g., Shock v. Sester, 405 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 1023 (1969), rehearing denied, 395 U.S. 941 (1969). It is interesting to note
that this case asserts the proposition that acts which deprived plaintiff of "equal
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been the basis of section 1983 suits. One court has even allowed relief
for the deprivation of a plaintiff's first amendment freedoms of speech
and association. 73
An extraordinary application of section 1983 occurred in the case of
York v. Story.7 4  In that case, a female plaintiff entered a California
Police Station, complaining that she had been assaulted. Defendant-po-
lice officer told her that it would be necessary to photograph her in the
nude, and consequently directed her to undress. Although she com-
plained that the bruises could not be seen in a photograph, plaintiff com-
plied with the officer's directives. The officer proceeded to take some
nude shots of plaintiff, many of which found her in indecent positions.
Several weeks later, defendant informed plaintiff that the pictures had not
"come out," and that the negatives had been destroyed. Actually, how-
ever, the pictures had developed nicely. In fact, they had turned out so
well that defendant printed duplicates and distributed them to his cohorts
in the police department.
Plaintiff brought suit under section 1983, proposing three alternative
bases for application of the section. First, plaintiff argued that she had
been subjected to an unreasonable search, which was a violation of the
fourth amendment, which applied to the states by reason of the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Second, plaintiff argued that
her right of privacy, guaranteed by the fourth amendment and applied to
the states by the due process clause, had been violated. Third, plaintiff
argued that defendant's acts constituted such an invasion of her privacy as
to amount to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, which is
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. 75
The court skipped over plaintiff's first and second arguments, and al-
lowed recovery based on her substantive due process argument. The court
ruled that privacy is implied in the idea of "ordered liberty" guaranteed
by the due process clause. Consequently, a deprivation of this right of
privacy produced a cause of action under section 1983.76
protection" must be intentional or purposeful in order to produce a section 1983 ac-
tion, despite the language in Monroe. Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585
(7th Cir. 1961); Lindsey v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Huey v.
Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
73. Nesmith v. Afford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975
(1964). This case allowed relief for white men who were arrested for eating lunch
with blacks in a public restaurant in Alabama. The court ruled that section 1983
provided a remedy for violations of a person's first amendment freedoms of associa-
tion and speech.
74. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
75. Id. at 451-54.
76. Id. at 455-56.
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Notwithstanding its unusual facts, York is significant because it demon-
strates the great breadth of section 1983. Many would argue that pri-
vacy is not implied in the concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, not
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Many would argue that the
members of the 42nd Congress never (even in their most liberal dreams)
intended to provide relief to a plaintiff who had been deprived of privacy
when they enacted section 1983. Many would argue that providing relief
in such a case is a gross example of judicial usurpation of legislative power.
After cases like York, however, all must agree that the American judi-
ciary is presently expanding the scope of this section to such an extent that
it may soon protect every right known to man.
With the above cases as precedents, Kerr v. City of Chicago came be-
fore the courts in 1970. Although no court had yet granted compensa-
tion for the extraction of an involuntary confession, it was obvious that
time was ripe for recovery based on such action. Consequently, defend-
ant police officers did not challenge the premise that the coercion of a con-
fession which was used to detain Kerr was a violation of the fourteenth
amendment which produced a section 1983 action. 77 This failure of the
defendants to dispute the allegation emphasizes that such is a logical result
of the judicial history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As a defense, the police officers asserted that the actions of which
they were accused, even if committed, did not deprive Kerr of his civil
rights. The defendant police officers reasoned in this manner. First,
Kerr's action was based upon the rights enunciated in the Escobedo7s
and Miranda79 decisions. Second, the interaction leading to the Kerr
case occurred in 1963, one year before the Escobedo and three years
before the Miranda decisions. Third, these landmark decisions were not
retroactive.8 1s Therefore, defendants concluded, Kerr was not deprived
of any rights; the rights of which Kerr claimed he was deprived were not
formulated at the time the action arose.8 '
The court responded that, "The defendants . . . have misconstrued
plaintiff's allegations of violation of his civil rights."'82 The court pointed
out that Kerr did not base his claim on the Escobedo and Miranda deci-
77. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 6-14.
78. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
80. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
81. Supra note 77.
82. Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir. 1970), rehearing
denied, (1970).
[Vol. XX
CASE NOTES
sions (in fact, Kerr admitted that these decisions are not retroactive). 83
Rather, observed the court, "plaintiff claims that his rights were violated
by the obtaining of an involuntary confession and the use of this confession
to detain illegally the plaintiff for a period of 18 months. 814  Plaintiff
based his claim, not on any newly-formulated rights, but on the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment.
A confession, of course, could be involuntary if extracted prior to the
Escobedo and Miranda decisions. The criterion for a coerced confession
was, in pre-Escobedo court rooms, and still is: had the will of the ac-
cused been overborn by pressure? In determining whether this had oc-
curred, the court is to consider all the circumstances of the case. This
includes all the actions relating to the confession-producing incident as
well as the age and social background of the accused.8 5
The United States Supreme Court recently enunciated these traditional
principles in the case of Spano v. New York. 86 Spano, a 25 year-old
man with a junior high school education, became involved in a fist fight.
Shortly afterward, he shot and killed his antagonist, and subsequently sur-
rendered to the police. Spano was interrogated by 15 different men for
eight consecutive hours, during which time his requests to see his attorney
were repeatedly denied. After eight hours, Spano confessed. In setting
aside Spano's conviction, the court held the confession, "inconsistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment under traditional principles. 87 Repeating
the rule that a court must look at all the circumstances in determining
whether a confession is voluntary, Mr. Justice Warren said: "We conclude
that petitioner's will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sym-
pathy falsely aroused, after considering all the facts in their post-indict-
ment setting."88
In conjunction with the above criterion and the trend of cases under
section 1983, the United States Court of Appeals held that Kerr's com-
plaint stated a valid cause of action. Ruling that a civil action may lie for
83. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4.
84. Supra note 82.
85. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-601 (1948) where the Court stated:
"If the undisputed evidence suggests that force or coercion was used to exact the
confession, we will not permit the judgment of conviction to stand. . . . The age
of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact
that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the police
towards his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a
child by means which the law should not sanction." See also Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528 (1963).
86. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
87. Id. at 320.
88. Supra note 86, at 323.
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the extraction of an involuntary confession, the court said: "All of the acts
are of great importance in determining whether plaintiff's confession was
coerced in violation of his civil rights and thereby cognizable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.11891 It is notable that not only physical mistreatment, but
all circumstances must be considered in determining the validity of a sec-
tion 1983 action for the extraction of an involuntary confession, and its
subsequent use to detain plaintiff.
The Kerr decision represents the latest development in the area of civil
rights litigation. It is interesting to consider whether the trend has now
terminated or will expand so that additional deprivations will produce
section 1983 actions. Of immediate concern is whether the extraction
of an involuntary confession in itself creates an action or whether that
extraction must be coupled with a subsequent detention of the plaintiff-
the situation in Kerr-in order for an action to arise. Related is the
question of whether the failure to give Miranda warnings-in post-Mir-
anda cases-is itself a deprivation of rights or privileges sufficient to pro-
duce an action.
Given the momentum of the trend, as well as the composition of today's
jurists, it is predictable that a civil action will arise for the coercion of a
confession itself. The damage award, of course, will not be as bountiful
as when the extraction is complemented by a later detention of the plain-
tiff. As for a complaint based entirely upon a defendant's failure to give
the Miranda warnings, it is doubtful that such will be upheld, even in
today's liberal-minded court rooms.00 Indeed, the failure to give Mir-
anda warnings, absent other extenuating circumstances, such as police
brutality or illegal detention, hardly seems a serious enough deprivation to
allow plaintiff to recover.
Finally, it is necessary to consider whether Kerr v. City of Chicago will
have an effect upon law enforcement in the United States. During the
last decade, various decisions such as Miranda and Mapp v. Ohio9l
have required that confessions illegally obtained or evidence illegally
seized be excluded from criminal trials; and furthermore, that their intro-
duction in the evidence amounted to reversible error. Hopefully, these de-
cisions would cause law enforcement officers to perform their duties con-
scientiously, thereby insuring that the constitutional rights of citizens would
be respected. Many legal authorities, however, claim that this hoped-
for result has not been effected. Professor Robert E. Burns observes:
89. Supra note 82, at 1138.
90. Ambrek v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Penn. 1968); Allen v. Eicher,
295 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1969).
91. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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From all appearances the police are unconcerned with most of their own depart-
mental regulations, much less with divided Supreme Court opinions offering police
consolation or rebuke depending upon whom you are reading. It is an eminently
fair question to ask whether local police, well aware of calendar turnover and vol-
untary guilty pleas in urban centers, are in fact deterred or encouraged to be fairer
than otherwise. If capital punishment does not deter an offender because it will
not happen, why should court exclusion of evidence or appellate reversal of trial
decisions deter police when ninety per cent of the time there will be no trial.9 2
An in-depth statistical study conducted by the editors of the Yale Law
Journal93 supports the contention of Professor Burns, and concludes that,
"[n]ot much has changed after Miranda . . the impact on law en-
forcement has been small."'9 4  Specifically, the researchers found: (1)
that police officers seldom gave suspects their Miranda warnings-out of
a sampling of 118 suspects, only 25 were given full advice of their con-
stitutional rights;9 5 and (2) when the police officer did give such ad-
vice, "he commonly de-fused the advice by implying that the suspect had
better not exercise his rights, or by delivering his statement . . . to indi-
cate that his remarks were simply a routine, meaningless legalism."9
The result of this study emphasizes the futility of trying to curb police ac-
tivity by "exclusionary rules" or by holdings that certain police "viola-
tions" are gounds for reversal.
If decisions such as Miranda have failed to deter police from violating
the rights of others, perhaps a change in judicial policy is indicated. The
Kerr decision, as well as other section 1983 actions, could represent that
change. As a result of these cases, the police officer who neglects to per-
form his duties in accordance with the Constitution might easily find him-
self the defendant in an expensive civil suit. As in Kerr, a law enforce-
ment officer who illegally coerces a confession might find himself sued
for $600,000. The police officer who is not deterred by exclusionary
rules and reversed convictions may be quite encouraged to abide by the
Constitution when he has a large personal pecuniary interest at stake.
Perhaps we must depend on cases like Kerr to insure that America be-
comes a land where law enforcement officers abide by, as well as enforce,
the laws.
Donald Lee Mrozek
92. Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80,
95-96 (1969).
93. Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519
(1967).
94. Id. at 1613.
95. Supra note 93, at 1550.
96. Supra note 93, at 1552.
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